Before the global financial crisis, Tajikistan was a major labour exporting and the world"s most remittances-dependent country. Remittances had contributed to a remarkable reduction in poverty. This paper exploits a new panel data set spanning the years 2007 to 2009 in order to investigate the effect of the financial crisis on migration and remittances patterns.
Introduction
Before the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Tajikistan was the labour exporting country with the highest share of GDP (45 percent) generated through remittances (Ratha et al., 2008) to Russia, where a plunging oil price helped to push the country into a severe recession throughout 2009. Tajikistan"s economic dependence on remittances from Russia was expected to lead to an immediate "import" of the crisis. As migrants who had previously remitted more than 80 percent of their foreign earnings now faced the risk of job loss and wage cuts, household receipts would be expected to decline sharply (Danzer and Ivaschenko, 2009; Marat, 2010; Ratha et al. 2010) . At the same time, Tajikistan suffered from falls in world market prices of major export commodities (aluminium and cotton) thus adding to economic pressure in the domestic labour market (NCC America 2010; Global Info Mine 2010) . This paper presents empirical evidence on the change in migration and remittance patterns in Tajikistan throughout the global financial recession. With help of a newly collected household panel data set in Tajikistan (the TLSS, see details below) that comprises two household surveys collected in October/November 2007 (pre-crisis) and in October/November 2009, respectively, we are able to document (i) a substantial increase in labour migration, (ii) an increased uncertainty involved in international migration, and (iii) a decline in the financial gains from migration, i.e., remittances by roughly 30 percent during the crisis.
Literature Review: Push and pull factors of migration during a global recession
The migration literature has produced substantial evidence on how migration responds in the face of aggregate shocks in destination (Becker et al., 2005) and source countries (McKenzie, 2003) . Also, changes in remittances through exchange rate shocks have been documented to impact on household expenditure levels (Yang, 2008) . However, little academic evidence exists on changes in migration and remittance patterns when the economic shock is of global nature (see Martin, 2009 ). This paper adds to this literature by comparing pre-and post-crisis migration and remittances patterns in Tajikistan. A simple push-pull model of migration can be useful to determine the general driving forces behind population movements (Schoorl et al., 2000) . For a global economic recession, this model predicts a reduction of pull factors from the destination country and an increase of push factors in the country of origin. Framed in our specific context, the economic returns from migrating to Russia are likely to drop as soon as the crisis hits Russia and as demand for foreign labour declines paired with stagnant or falling wages. The construction sector in Russia, which had provided stable jobs for the majority of Tajikistani migrants, contracted output-wise by almost 20 percent in the first three quarters of 2009 (Obetkon, 2009; Martin, 2009) . At the same time Tajikistan"s domestic economy is hurt by the decline in commodity prices for aluminium and cotton (NCC America 2010; Global Info Mine 2010), adding incentives to leave the country. Oddly enough, the country is expected to be predominantly hurt through declining remittances from Russia, as exported labour actually comprises the largest economic "sector" of Tajikistan accounting for 45 percent of GDP in 2007 (Ratha et al., 2008) . Macroeconomic data from the first months of the financial crisis indeed suggest a decrease in remittances of roughly 30 percent (World Bank, 2010 ).
The recent growth success of Tajikistan on the one hand and a substantial vulnerability to external shocks on the other hand are both deeply rooted in the country"s economic reliance on remittances (Danzer and Ivaschenko, 2009; Shahriari et al., 2009 ).
What performed well as a cure to widespread poverty since the mid 2000s may cause concern during crisis if households became over-reliant on a source of funding that might turn out to be volatile. Over-reliance on migration might imply that household have no other activity choice than further extending their increasingly risky migration business. As Tajikistan might be trapped in such a remittances curse (cp. Keely and Tran, 1989) , it is of crucial importance to understand whether push or pull factors dominate and whether migration stocks will rise or fall during recession.
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If the migration stock from Tajikistan increased during the financial crisis (suggesting the push factors were dominant) it remains to be explained how migration patterns changed.
Higher migration stocks in Russia could be attributable to (a) longer stays abroad or (b) higher migration flows. In South-South migration, one can expect durations of stays to decrease if macroeconomic conditions and employment prospects become more volatile (Parrado and Cerrutti, 2003) . Also, tighter controls on immigrants might be introduced in the destination country during times of crisis. To the opposite, migrants may try to "hibernate" the crisis abroad either because they lack funds to return or because they fear later refusal of re-entry (Martin, 2009; Ratha et al., 2009 ) thus prolonging their stay abroad. Also, potentially lower earnings abroad might increase migration duration in order to meet a specific savings target.
Persistent levels of migration during periods of increased uncertainty require some micro-economic behavioural explanation. It turns out that network theory provides a suitable framework for studying the changes in migration behaviour during crisis (Massey et al., 1993): Personal networks reduce the cost and risk of moving abroad. At the same time, they provide protection from deportation and harassment. In sum, while push and pull factors explain the motivation for migration personal networks are the means of realising it.
Rising migration uncertainty during the financial crisis
Migration is always risky. This can be easily understood if one considered that an individual planning a stay abroad has to compare-in economics jargon-two utility functions which contain several arguments (e.g., income as the product of the chance to find a job and the prevailing wage rate, leisure with and without the family). This comparison is non-trivial as the individual better knows the likely realization of outcomes at home as compared to a distant migration destination (Jaeger et al., forthcoming) . During economic recession, the uncertainty about the success of a move further increases. Even for previous migrants, actual economic conditions and fluctuating demand for foreign labour are hard to grasp. Consequently, migration patterns might change when uncertainty increases. More specifically, the selection of migrants, the actual decisions how and where to move as well as the return from migration is likely to respond in the following ways:
First, if migration risks rise, relatively less risk-averse persons would be drawn into migration. Theoretically, young people are more inclined to migrate as they have invested less in home country or firm specific human capital (Goss and Paul, 1986) and fewer family obligations. Even in the light of curbed labour demand, young people might migrate to Russia for educational purposes and then work occasionally or permanently. Thus, we hypothesize to observe a decrease in the age at migration. Second, higher uncertainty will manifest itself in greater difficulties to acquire a job abroad. This might be paired with lower chances of obtaining legal residence status, either because immigration becomes recognized as a burden on natives" labour market prospects or because registration officials surcharge in bribes (Olimov and Bosc, 2003) . Thus, we hypothesize that fewer migrants can arrange work prior to moving and that fewer migrants are able to legalize their residence. In turn, more migrants have to return involuntarily. In order to reduce some of these risks, we expect migrants to rely stronger on personal networks when organizing migration trips. This reliance, however, increases dependence on few migration destinations, especially Moscow.
Third, the financial returns from migrating (of which a large proportion is sent home in the form of remittances) can be expected to directly decline as a consequence from increased unemployment and reduced earnings. However, more interesting is whether migrants will change their remitting behaviour as a response to higher uncertainty abroad.
Migrants in an uncertain environment might reduce remittances even in the absence of job or wage loss if they wished to build up precautionary savings. Anecdotal evidence tells that some Tajikistani migrants were unable to return to Tajikistan during the crisis simply because they lacked the funds to do so (International Crisis Group, 2010) . Thus, we hypothesize that migrants will remit lower shares of their foreign earnings to their domestic household during the financial crisis. 
Data and Methodology
For our empirical analysis we use two waves of the Tajikistan Living Standard Measurement Survey (TLSS) which was administered by the World Bank and UNICEF. Well before the financial crisis, the first wave was collected during October and November 2007 comprising a total of 4,500 households and 32,000 individuals. In late 2009 (October and November), a randomly drawn subsample of these households (totalling to 1,503 households and 7,000 individuals) were re-interviewed.
3 Specific attention was paid to the inclusion of a migration module that collected monthly migration information for all household members.
The data include the dates, destinations and durations of cross-border moves as well as information on personal migration networks. Additionally, earnings and remittances can be retrieved from the survey.
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To shed light on changes in migration stocks, as well as migration and remittances patterns, we will predominantly provide descriptive evidence in the repeated cross-sectional setting. Owing to the collection of retrospective monthly migration information data in the 2009 TLSS, we are able to exactly track migrants through the crisis. To study dynamics throughout the crisis we will additionally provide some transition matrices for all 1,503 panel households. Unless otherwise stated, all calculations are performed by the authors using the TLSS data set.
Results
The stock of Tajikistani migrants abroad 5 has risen sharply during the global financial crisis. As Figure 1 indicates, the total stock of international migrants in the total Tajikistani have not returned yet. As migrants who are still abroad must be included into the overall picture, return hazards are a useful tool to detect changes in migration durations (Lindstrom, 1996; Reyes, 2001) . Figure 2 shows monthly return hazards starting from 12 months prior to the survey dates. Each vertical drop expresses the share of initially absent migrants returning 6 Survey based evidence on migration duration suffers from not observing households who left the country altogether, but the number of those should be small in Tajikistan as households are normally large and as ethnic migration is no longer prevalent.
to Tajikistan in a specific month. The full line (2009) We find strong evidence that migration patterns respond to the increased risk from As younger people migrate, fewer of them have previous migration experience so that they have to rely stronger on personal networks with family and acquaintances ( Figure 5 ). It should be noted that personal networks often have developed into migration support businesses, and migrants have to pay for the assistance provided by their relatives or acquaintances. Owing to reduced demand for foreign labour, the crisis has made it harder for migrants to arrange jobs from home. This implies that more migrants go to Russia without securing employment prior to their departures. However, established migration networks among family members and acquaintances not only reduce the cost of migration but also the risk associated with the move (Massey et al., 1993) . As such, personal networks are an important medium to sustain the high stock of migrants abroad even in the face of increased labour market uncertainties in the destination country. The increased uncertainty of migration is also manifested in the various return reasons stated by migrants. While in 2007 the return decision was dominated by specific pull factors in the home country, push factors have gained in importance during the crisis (Table 3) . With the change of migration patterns during the financial crisis remittances were affected, too. On the one hand, we observe slightly lower ratios of migrants remitting money or remitting at all ( 
Conclusion
In this paper we showed that the global financial crisis further increased migration in a highly remittances dependent country, Tajikistan. The decline in the value of remittances coincides with the domestic economic slowdown in Tajikistan, so that households further expand the established migration system to cope with the domestic crisis. Despite the global financial crisis remittances remained a major source of finance for many households who have to bear most of the risk of Tajikistan"s external dependence:
(1) The stock of Tajikistani migrants has increased during the period of economic crisis broadening the base but also the risks of remittance receipt.
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(1A) The increase in the stock of migrants was driven by a higher rate of Tajikistani migrants going abroad in 2009 compared to the pre-crisis period. In order to increase employment chances, many households started to send more than one migrant abroad during the crisis.
(1B) Simultaneously, the average migration duration declined slightly, increasing relative migration costs.
(2) The pattern of migration has become more "risky"-during the crisis the average migrant was significantly younger than before and found it harder to obtain legal residence permits.
At the same time, the share of migrants with pre-arranged (before departure) jobs declined implying more involuntary returns to Tajikistan as push factors in the destination country pressurize more migrants to leave. Households respond to these risks by relying more on familiar destinations with existing support networks. This reduces scope for regional diversification, however, the recently increasing share of women migrants points to increasing occupational diversification.
(3) Returns from migration fell as the average volume of real remittances per migrant declined by 30 percent. This reduction is predominantly driven by precautionary savings of the migrants owing to increased risks.
